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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Cases
Appellant Tabatha Frakes appeals from her judgment of conviction and sentences for

conspiracy to traffic in more than 400 grams of methamphetamine in violation ofl.C. §§
18-1701, 37-2732B(a)(4) and 37-2732B(b) and trafficking in more than 400 grams of
methamphetamine in violation of §37-2732B(a)(4). Specifically, as applied to this case,
application of the 10 year mandatory minimum sentences pursuant to subsection 37-2732B(a)(4)
(C) violates separation of powers and Tabatha's rights to due process, to equal protection, to
remain silent and to trial. Further, the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain the
trafficking conviction and due process requires that it be vacated. Accordingly, this Court should
vacate Tabatha's judgment of conviction and sentences and remand with instruction for the
district court to re-sentence Tabatha on the conspiracy charge without regard to the mandatory
minimum fixed period of imprisonment.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
According to Doug and Athena Lopez's testimony as prosecution witnesses at Tabatha's

trial, the couple made a living selling methamphetamine. Tr. p. 273, In. 3-17; p. 317, In. 17-19; p.
366, In. 11 - p. 367, In. 25. Between approximately December 2017 and their arrest on June 13,
2018, husband and wife testified that they regularly traveled to a city near Los Angeles,
California ("LA") to purchase between a half and two pounds of meth, which they sold in Idaho
in varying quantities. Id. at p. 273, In. 18 - p. 274, In. 5; p. 317, In. 20 - 319, In. 7. As their supply
would dwindle, the Lopezes would contact their source in the LA area and arrange a time to visit.
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Id. at p. 273, In. 18-25; p. 317, In. 20 - 319, In. 7. The Lopezes testified that would meet the
source at his storage shed near LA where Athena would enter the unit and provide him with a
pre-arranged amount of cash. Id. at p. 274, In. 1-5; p. 283, In. 8-15; p. 291, In. 21 - p. 292, In. 4.
The couple would rent a nearby hotel and wait for the source to deliver the methamphetamine.

Id. at p. 274, In. 5-23; p. 319, In. 20 - p. 320, In. 6.
With a round-trip drive of almost 30 hours, the Lopezes testified that they found
themselves too tired to drive safely and solicited the assistance of friends to help drive on some
trips. Id. at p. 276, In. 18 - p. 277, In. 9; p. 319, In. 8-19; p. 322, In. 22 - p. 323, In. 1. Sometime
in 2017, the Lopezes befriended Tabatha, a meth addict, and, in May 2018, they moved into her
home to help with rent and other bills. Id. at p. 265, In. 7-24; p. 266, In. 10-22; p. 272, In. 19 - p.
273, In. 2; p. 311, In. 7-17; p. 312, In. 10-20; p. 317, In. 4-9. In exchange for helping Tabatha
catch up on bills, the Lopezes testified that they asked her to help drive on an upcoming trip to
California. Id. at p. 265, In. 7-24; p. 277, In. 13 - p. 278, In. 17; p. 311, In. 9-17; p. 321, In. 8-15;
p. 324, In. 12-14; p. 3281n. 10-15.
The Lopezes and Tabatha took turns driving on the May trip and the Lopezes paid for all
the food and lodging. Id. at p. 280, In. 22 - p. 281, In. 21; p. 282, In. 5-10; p. 322, In. 16-21; p.
323, In. 2-19. The Lopezes also kept their "travel bong" in between the driver and passenger
seats, which allowed a passenger to apply a flame underneath the meth while the driver used a
tube to inhale the smoke. Id. at p. 295, In. 10 - p. 296, In. 10; p. 340, In. 6 - p. 341, In. 14; Exhibit
10. According to the Lopezes' trial testimony, they and Tabatha smoked from the travel bong on
their trips to California. Id. at p. 340, In. 20 - p. 342, In. 6.
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Upon arrival in LA, the Lopezes testified that the three traveled to the storage unit where
Tabatha waited in the vehicle while Athena paid the source. Id. at p. 283, In. 16 - p. 284, In. 8; p.
323, In. 24 - p. 324, In. 16. As the source arrived at the hotel room to deliver the
methamphetamine, Tabatha and Athena left to soak in the hotel hot tub. Id. at p. 284, In. 17 - p.
285, In. 10; p. 325, In. 1 - p. 326, In. 7. Thus, the Lopezes testified that Tabatha was not present
while Doug and the source conducted business. Id. at p. 285, In. 11-25; p. 325, In. 21 - p. 326, In.
11. The three returned to Idaho where the Lopezes sold the meth. Id. at p. 328, In. 5-9.
Tabatha's granddaughter passed away and, in early June 2018, she traveled to South
Carolina for her funeral. Id. at p. 329, In. 2-6. After Tabatha returned, the Lopezes testified that
they again asked her to help drive, this time in exchange for $300 or $400. Id. at p. 278, In.
12-14; p. 321, In. 8-21; p. 352, In. 13-22. The day after the Lopezes picked up Tabatha at the
airport, about June 11, she and the Lopezes departed for California in Athena's maroon minivan,
again sharing the driving on the trip. Id. at p. 276, In. 1-9; p. 277, In. 13 - p. 278, In. 3; p. 329, In.
2-6; p. 288, In. 14-18; p. 352, In. 13-22. The Lopezes testified that Tabatha waited at the vehicle
while Athena paid the source in the storage unit. Id. at p. 291, In. 15 - p. 292, In. 10; p. 330, In.
22 - p. 332, In. 6.
The hotel on the June trip did not have a pool and the Lopezes testified that Tabatha and
Athena remained in the hotel room when the source arrived to deliver the meth. Id. at p. 297, In.
20 - p. 298, In. 17; p. 333, In. 1-13. Doug testified that the source provided two, one-pound
bricks ofmeth separately wrapped in cellophane. Id. at p. 326, In. 11-25. Doug unwrapped one
brick, weighed it on a scale set on the room's desk and put the re-packaged pound into a large
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ziplock baggie. Id. at p. 329, In. 11-14; p. 333, In. 14 - p. 334, In. 6; p. 337, In. 3-7; Exhibit 9.
Doug then set aside some meth for personal use and weighed out 9 separate baggies each with an
ounce of meth. Id. at p. 335, In. 22 - p. 336, In. 24; Exhibit 9. Doug placed the remaining meth
into a zip lock baggie and then placed that baggie along with the 9, I-ounce baggies into a large
ziplock baggie. Id. at p. 336, In. 24 - p. 337, In. 7. Doug placed the bulk meth into a large
garbage sack and packed it into his duffle bag along with his clothes and other belongings. Id. at
p. 202, In. 2-12; p. 203, In. 11 - p. 206, In. 5; p. 337, In. 10 - p. 338, In. 5; p. 340, In. 6-25; p. 388,
In. 5-13; Exhibits 5A- D, 6A-7, 13. Doug testified that he did not recall where Tabatha was
located in the room at the time he obtained and re-packaged the meth but the Lopezes testified
that Doug made no effort to hide his activities. Id. at p. 291, In. 15 - p. 292, In. 10; p. 298, In.
18-22; p. 334, In. 7-12.
Doug put some of the meth, which he set aside for personal use, into a pipe. Id. at p. 337,
In. 13 - p. 338, In. 5; p. 339, In. 13 - p. 341, In. 13; Exhibit 11. Doug also put some of the meth he
had set aside into the travel bong and testified that he, Athena and Tabatha smoked from the
travel bong on the return trip to Boise. Id. at p. 340, In. 20 - p. 342, In. 6. Doug's duffle bag,
with the bulk meth and his belongings, was in minivan's cargo area along with Athena and
Tabatha's bags, trash and miscellaneous clutter. Id. at p. 201, In. 20 -25; p. 203, In. 13-19;
Exhibits 5A - D.
Meanwhile, the Lopezes' drug dealing had fallen under law enforcement's radar. Id. at p.
273, In. 3-17; p. 317, In. 17; p. 366, In. 11 - p. 367, In. 25; p. 414, In. 4-9. In April 2018, a
narcotics detective out of Boise received a tip that a minivan would be returning from California
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with a quantity of meth. Id. at p. 366, In. 11 - p. 367, In. 25. On June 12, 2018, the narcotics
detective and task force officers traveled to Jackpot, Nevada to surveil the Lopezes upon their
return to Idaho. Id. at p. 366, In. 11 - p. 367, In. 25; p. 368, In. 20-24; p. 370, In. 10 - p. 371, In. 7;
p. 377, In. 6-19; p. 414, In. 4-9. The officers planned to establish probable cause to initiate a
traffic stop once the Lopezes arrived in Ada, County and utilize a dog trained to detect the odor
of narcotics ("K-9") while investigating the traffic violation. Id. at p. 377, In. 6-19; p. 414, In.
4-9. Surveillance noted that the Lopezes' vehicle exceeded the speed limit and failed to signal for
a lane change. Id. at p. 181, In. 10-22; p. 182, In. 23-25.
Around 2:00 a.m. on June 13, the Lopezes' vehicle neared Boise with Tabatha driving,
Doug in the passenger seat and Athena asleep on the floor of the cargo area. Id. at p. 181, In.
10-22; p. 182, In. 3 - p. 183, In. 2; p. 184, In. 10 - p. 185, In. 24; p. 191, In. 23 - p. 192, In. 3; p.
253, In. 4-8; p. 250, In. 1-7; Exhibit 2. Two patrol officers began following at a distance and
pulled in behind the minivan after it exited the freeway and parked at a gas station. Id. at p. 181,
In. 10-22; p. 182, In. 3 - p. 184, In. 6. Other officers - including one with a K-9, also arrived on
the scene. Id. at p. 187, In. 7 - p. 188, In. 2; p. 249, In. 19 -25; Exhibits 2, 8.
The officers removed Tabatha, Doug and Athena so that the K-9 could search the vehicle.

Id. at p. 188, In. 13 - p. 189, In. 3; p. 191, In. 23 - p. 192, In. 6; p. 193, In. 2 - p. 194, In. 1; p. 253,
In. 9-13; Exhibit 2. The K-9 officer ran his dog around the vehicle and it alerted to the odor of
narcotics. Id. at p. 253, In. 11 - p. 254, In. 20; p. 258, In. 7-20; p. 260, 1-9; Exhibit 8. The K-9
officer informed the officers who initiated the traffic stop that his dog had alerted. Id. at p. 260,
In. 16-24. An officer searched the caravan, finding the travel bong in the area between the two
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front seats and the bulk quantity of methamphetamine in Doug's backpack. Id. at p. 194, In. 2 - p.
196, In. 11; p. 199, In. 10 - 200, In. 4; p. 203, In. 13-19; p. 253, In. 14 - p. 254, In. 25; Exhibits
3-13.
The Lopezes and Tabatha were arrested and charged with trafficking in
methamphetamine by knowingly possessing more than 400 grams of methamphetamine. R.
10-11; 32-33. The state moved to consolidate Tabatha's case with Doug and Athena's, which the
court granted. R. 12-14, 47-48. The magistrate set bond at a million dollars. R. 16-17. On July
18, 2018, Tabatha waived her right to a preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district
court on charges of trafficking in more than 400 grams of meth and possession of paraphernalia.
R. 27-29, 32-33.

The prosecutor had hoped Tabatha "would be honest about her role and agree to
[cooperate] with law enforcement." Tr, p. 548, In. 2-9. However, on August 13, 2018, Tabatha
pled not guilty and the case was scheduled for trial. R. 35. On August 14, 2018, the state indicted
Tabatha for conspiracy to traffic more than 400 grams of methamphetamine and the prosecutor
then moved to consolidate the conspiracy case with the trafficking case, which the district court
granted. R. 35-36, 153, 158-160; Grand Jury Transcript.
Prior to trial, the state agreed to allege that the quantity involved in the Lopezes'
trafficking offense was between 200 and 400 grams, which authorized the district court to
sentence them to a mandatory minimum 5 year term, in exchange for their "truthful" testimony at
Tabatha's trial. Tr. p. 270, In. 4 - p. 271, In. 22; p. 314, In. 7 - p. 315, In. 20.
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The jury found Tabatha guilty of conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, trafficking in
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 85-86. At sentencing, the prosecutor
indicated that she did not initially indict Tabatha for conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine
because "we recognized her role [was limited to helping the Lopezes drive knowing they were
obtaining meth to sell], and our hope was that [she] would be honest about her role and agree to
be cooperative with law enforcement." Tr. p. 548, In. 2-9.
The prosecutor conceded: "all along it's been the State's position that [Tabatha] is less
culpable than the Lopezes" and she "struggled with their ability to get the" 5year mandatory
minimum instead of the 10 year minimum that applied to Tabatha. Id. at p. 548, In. 21 - p. 549,
In. 9. The prosecutor explained that the difference was "the Lopezes were willing to accept
responsibility and plead guilty and cooperate with law enforcement." Id. at p. 548, In. 21-25; p.
549, In. 10 - 550, In. 1.
Tabatha's counsel noted he normally is able to advise clients they will not be penalized
for exercising their right to trial but application of the mandatory minimums do penalize
defendants and: "Tabatha is being penalized for exercising her constitutional rights." Id. at p.
553, In. 1-15. The district court found that it did not penalize Tabatha's exercise of her
"constitutional right to go to trial" and that the "punishment, severe as it is, is for trafficking
methamphetamine in this weight" is determined by the legislature." Id. at p. 558, In. 8-18. The
district court noted it was "the legislature's job" to weigh "the good the statute does in keeping
drugs off the street" with deficiencies, such as treating "all people exactly the same who are in
knowledge of, and therefore possession of, a certain amount of substance." Id. at p. 559, In. 1-12.
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The district court noted Tabatha's case illustrated the trafficking statute's deficiency and
lamented its inability to fashion a sentence that would better account for Tabatha's role in the
offense. Id. at p. 559, In. 1 - p. 560, In. 9.
Noting it had no choice, the district court indicated:
And so the only thing I can do and hope is that [Tabatha] is able to use this time that she is
hopefully not exposed to drugs to heal her body, her mind and to focus on reclaiming her life
for when she gets out and enjoy the rest of her life clean and sober and in a way that brings
her joy and contentment and happiness, let's just put it that way. I hope you do that, I hope
you can find some good in this.

Id. at p. 560, In. 10-17. The district court imposed concurrent 10 year determinate terms with no
indeterminate sentences. Id. at p. 560, In. 11 - p. 561, In. 18. This appeal follows.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Must this Court vacate Tabatha's sentences pursuant to LC. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(C)

because requiring the district court to impose fixed 10 year terms unconstitutionally infringes on
the judiciary's inherent authority to suspend a sentence under Article V, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution?
2.

Must this Court vacate Tabatha's sentences because the state's decision to permit

the district court to sentence the Lopezes under LC. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(B) in exchange for their
assistance in ensuring that Tabatha was sentenced under LC. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(C) violated her
rights to equal protection and due process under Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho
Constitution and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United Constitution and impermissibly
infringed on her privilege against self-incrimination and rights to trial under Article 1, Sections 7
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and 13 of the Idaho Constitution and under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution?
3.

Must this Court vacate Tabatha's judgment of conviction for trafficking in

methamphetamine because insufficient evidence supported the verdict and the conviction
therefore violates due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Requiring the District Court To Impose The Ten Year Mandatory Minimum
Violated The State and Federal Constitutions Under The Facts Of This Case
Idaho's drug trafficking statute provides for mandatory minimum prison terms, which

vary between 1 and 15 years depending on the type and quantity of controlled substance. LC. §
37-2732B(a). The statute directs that the court must impose the "mandatory minimum fixed term
of imprisonment prescribed in this section" on any person found guilty of trafficking. LC. §
37-2732B(a)(8). The court must not suspend, defer or withhold the "adjudication of guilt or the
imposition or execution of sentence" or retain jurisdiction and the person shall not be eligible for
parole prior to serving the fixed term. Id.
The mandatory minimum sentences provided in the trafficking statute have been held to
fall within a narrow exception to the judiciary's inherent authority to sentence offenders, which
was granted the legislature by a 1978 amendment to Article 5, Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. State v. Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 380, 347 P.3d 1189, 1194 (2015); State v. Sarabia,
125 Idaho 815, 817, 875 P.2d 227, 229 (1994) (superseded by statute per 1995 Idaho Laws Ch.
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103 (H.B. 177)). The trafficking statute has also survived constitutional challenges because
greater punishment for crimes involving larger amounts of controlled substances is rationally
related to the state's legitimate interest in curbing large-scale possession, manufacturing, and
distribution of controlled substances. State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 616, 977 P.2d 228, 230 (Ct.
App. 1998); State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 56, 966 P.2d 53, 56 (Ct. App. 1998).
The state charged Tabatha and the Lopezes with the crime of trafficking in
methamphetamine under section 37-2732B(a)(4), which is committed by knowingly possessing,
delivering, or bringing methamphetamine into Idaho where the meth weighed 28 grams or more.
See State v. Wilson, 165 Idaho 64, 438 P.3d 302, 306 (2019). The state also charged Tabatha and
the Lopezes with conspiring to traffic in meth under LC.§ 37-2732B(b), which is punishable as
if she had actually possessed, delivered or brought meth into the state.
The mandatory minimum fixed term, which the court must impose for trafficking or
conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine, depends on the "quantity involved." LC. §
37-2732B(a)(4). The court must impose: (A) a 3 year minimum if the quantity involved is
between 28 and 200 grams; (B) a 5 year minimum if the quantity involved is between 200 and
400 grams; and (C) a 10 year minimum if the quantity involved is more than 400 grams. Id.
The two pounds the Lopezes purchased in California in June 2018 constituted more than
800 grams, invoking the 10 year mandatory minimum under Section 37-2732B(a)(4)(C). The
Lopezes testified that they also brought two pounds to Idaho in May 2018 and between half and
1 pound on multiple other occasions. Nonetheless, the state alleged that the quantity involved in
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the Lopezes' trafficking offenses was between 200 and 400 grams, which granted the court
authority to sentence them to a mandatory 5 year, instead of 10 year, fixed term.
The state made this charging decision in response to Tabatha's exercise of her rights to
remain silent and to trial and in exchange for the Lopezes' help ensuring Tabatha's conviction.
However, everyone agreed Tabatha was the least culpable party and that her role was helping the
Lopezes drive on two occasions. These circumstances take the case outside the narrow limitation
to the judiciary's inherent sentencing authority set forth in Article 5, Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution. Further, where the Lopezes were clearly more culpable, the prosecutor's decision to
allege a lower quantity against the Lopezes to ensure Tabatha's conviction bore no rational
relationship to the state's legitimate interest in curbing large-scale drug distribution. Accordingly,
the limitation on the district court's sentencing authority in this case violates Tabatha's rights to
due process, to equal protection, to remain silent and to require the state to prove her guilt at
trial.
The district court's comments at sentencing reflected a belief that the 10 year fixed terms
were not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing and that it could have fashioned better
sentences that would have furthered Tabatha's rehabilitation, deterred others and protect society.
Accordingly, this case must be remanded so that the district court has the opportunity to so
exercise its discretion.
1.

Standard of review

Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 598, 261
P.3d 853,875 (2011); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195,197,969 P.2d 244,246 (1998). The party
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challenging a statute on constitutional grounds must establish that the statute is unconstitutional
by overcoming a presumption of validity. State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 689, 390 P.3d 412,415
(2017); State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 418, 272 P.3d 382, 390 (2012).
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied" to the
party's conduct. Lochsa Falls, L.L.C. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 240--41, 207 P.3d 963, 971-72
(2009). An as-applied constitutional challenge is based on the particular facts of a defendant's
case, which are generally ascertained at trial. Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 426-27, 272 P.3d at
398-99; State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 263, 192 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 2008).

2.

Facts in Support of Argument

The prosecutor initially did not charge Tabatha with conspiracy in recognition of her
relatively minor role and with hope that Tabatha "would be honest" and agree to be cooperate
with law enforcement. Tr. p. 548, In. 2-9. However, after Tabatha pled not guilty, the state
indicted her for conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine for agreeing to assist drive on the two
trips to California. Tr. p., 7, In. 7 - p. 8, In. 9; R. 158-160; Grand Jury Transcript.
The state then agreed to allege that the quantity involved in Athena and Doug's
trafficking offenses was only 200 to 400 grams in exchange for their agreement to testify for the
prosecution at Tabatha's trial. Tr. p. 270, In. 4-25; p. 271, In. 1-22; p. 314, In. 7-14. At trial,
Doug and Athena testified that they asked Tabatha to help drive on the two trips to California and
that she knew the purpose of the trips was for the Lopezes to purchase a quantity of meth. Tr. p.
264-354. Doug and Athena testified that Tabatha was present at the storage unit on both trips and
in the motel room when the source delivered the meth on the June trip. Id. at p. 297, In. 20 - p.
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298, In. 22; p. 330, In. 22 - p. 332, In. 6; p. 333, In. 1-13; p. 334, In. 7-12; p. 339, In. 13 - p. 341,
In. 13. The Lopezes also testified that Tabatha used meth from the purchased quantity, that had
been placed in the travel bong. Id. at p. 297, In. 20 - p. 298, In. 22; p. 339, In. 13 - p. 341, In. 13.
At sentencing, the prosecutor indicated that she "recognized [Tabatha's] role, and our
hope was that [she] would be honest about her role and agree to be cooperative with law
enforcement." Tr. p. 548, In. 2-9. The prosecutor conceded: "all along it's been the State's
position that [Tabatha] is less culpable than the Lopezes" and she "struggled with their ability to
get the five-year mandatory minimum" instead of the 10 year minimum that applied to Tabatha.

Id. at p. 548, In. 21 p. 549, In. 9. The difference was "the Lopezes were willing to accept
responsibility and plead guilty and cooperate with law enforcement." Id. at In. 21-25; p. 549, In.
10 - 550, In. 1.
Tabatha's counsel noted the impact of the mandatory minimum sentences was that
"Tabatha is being penalized for exercising her constitutional rights." Id. at p. 553, In. 13-15. In
imposing sentence, the district court noted that it would not punish Tabatha or any defendant for
exercising the right to trial but the "punishment, severe as it is, is for trafficking
methamphetamine in this weight" is determined by the legislature. Id. at p. 558, In. 8-18.
The district court noted "deficiencies with mandatory minimums" including that it treats
"all people exactly the same who are in knowledge of, and therefore possession of, a certain
amount of substance." Id. at p. 559, In. 1-12. The district court explained:
The role of the court and of the judge is through experience, education, to bring some
degree of measure to differentiate people who have been convicted of the same offense,
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to determine what is best, in light of those Tohil/ 1 factors I outlined, in light of the
objectives and criteria of sentencing, what is the best sentence. Not every person who
commits the same crime is either deserving of or the best sentence is exactly the same.
That is, in my view, a deficiency in the mandatory minimums. I'm not saying that that
weighs against the overall good that the harsh penalties bring in terms of deterring drug
trafficking in our community; that, again, is the legislature's decision.
But here I sit facing one of those cases where the deficiency is producing a result that I
think even the prosecutor recognizes is not optimal, that in some ways is not just when
compared to the conduct of other defendants.
It is just in the sense that the legislature has said this is just and this is what the sentence
is, and that's our community speaking through the legislature and that's fine, but at the
end of the day it comes back to I really have no choice here.
And so the only thing I can do and hope is that [Tabatha] is able to use this time that she
is hopefully not exposed to drugs to heal her body, her mind and to focus on reclaiming
her life for when she gets out and enjoy the rest of her life clean and sober and in a way
that brings her joy and contentment and happiness, let's just put it that way. I hope you do
that, I hope you can find some good in this.

Id. at p. 559, In. 13 - p. 560, In. 17. The district court then sentenced Tabatha to the fixed
mandatory terms of 10 years followed by no indeterminate terms. Id. at p. 560, In. 17 - p. 561, In.
9.

3.

This Court must vacate Tabatha's sentences because I.C. § 37-2732B's
application in this case unconstitutionally infringes on the judiciary's
inherent authority to sentence under Article V, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution

The Idaho Constitution prohibits any branch of government from exercising powers that
properly belong to another branch, unless expressly directed or permitted under the constitution.
Idaho Const. art. II, § 1. Our constitution bestows the power to define crimes on the legislature
1 Under

Toohill, a sentence of confinement is reasonable to the extent deemed necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103
Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
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whereas the judiciary holds the authority to sentence offenders found guilty of crimes. Olivas,
158 Idaho at 380, 347 P.3d at 1194; Spanton v. Clapp, 78 Idaho 234, 237, 299 P.2d 1103, 1104
(1956); Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 276, 108 P.3d 417, 423 (Ct. App. 2005). This Court
has very circumspect in protecting the autonomy our constitution envisioned for the judiciary.

Olivas, 158 Idaho at 379-80, 347 P.3d at 1193-94; State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240, 486 P.2d
247, 251 (1971) (superseded by Idaho Const. art. V, § 13 as amended by S.L. 1978, p. 1032,
H.J.R. No. 6, ratified Nov. 7, 1978).
The judiciary's inherent power to sentence necessarily includes the power to suspend that
sentence. State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 111, 343 P.3d 1110, 1118 (2015); State v. Petersen, 149
Idaho 808, 814, 241 P.3d 981, 987 (Ct. App. 2010). The legislature cannot enact a statute
depriving the judiciary of its authority to suspend a sentence absent an explicit constitutional
provision granting that authority. Olivas, 158 Idaho at 380, 347 P.3d at 1194; Thiel, 158 Idaho at
111,343 P.3d at 1118; State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790,792,919 P.2d 319,321 (1996).
In 1978, Idaho amended Article V, Section 13 to provide that "the legislature can provide
mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than
the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed
shall not be reduced." Idaho Const. art. V, § 13; see also H.J. Res. No. 6, 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws
1032, 1032-33. This constitutional amendment "provides a narrow exception for the legislature
to exercise powers traditionally granted to the judicial branch" whereby the legislature may
encroach on the court's sentencing powers by enacting an express mandatory minimum sentence
pursuant to Article V, Section 13. Olivas, 158 Idaho at 379-80, 347 P.3d at 1193-94.
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This Court has very circumspect in protecting the autonomy our constitution envisioned
for the judiciary. Olivas, 158 Idaho at 379-80, 347 P.3d at 1193-94; McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240,
486 P.2d at 251. If a statute's fixed term does not fall squarely within the specific limitation on
inherent judicial power specified in the 1978 amendment, the trial courts are free to exercise their
inherent power to impose the fixed term sentences they consider appropriate. Sarabia, 125 Idaho
at 817, 875 P.2d at 229.
For instance, in Sarabia, the Court addressed a prior version of the drug trafficking
statute, which allowed the court to sentence below the mandatory minimum when the prosecutor
asked the court to do so based on substantial assistance "in the identification, arrest and
prosecution of any of [the person's] accomplices, accessories, coconspirators, principals, sources
of supply, or of any other person involved in dealing in a controlled substance." Sarabia, 125
Idaho at 817, 875 P.2d at 229. The Court held that the subsection's provision allowing the judge
to reduce or suspend a fixed term sentence provided for a hybrid form of fixed term sentence that
did not fall within the specific limitation on inherent judicial power" granted under Article. 5, §
13. Id. The Court thus held that the statute was "unconstitutional, null, void, and unenforceable"
and "trial courts are free to exercise their inherent power to impose the fixed term sentences they
consider appropriate." Id
The 1995 Idaho Legislature responded to Sarabia by amending LC. § 37-2732B to delete
the substantial assistance section. 1995 Idaho Laws Ch. 103 (H.B. 177); see also State v. Puetz,
129 Idaho 842, 844, 934 P.2d 15, 17 (1997). The current statute no longer provides any means by
which the court may reduce the mandatory sentences, thereby seeming to meet the requirement
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of art. V, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution providing that mandatory minimum sentences "shall not
be reduced." Puetz, 129 Idaho at 844, 934 P.2d at 17; State v. Pena-Reyes, 131 Idaho 656, 657,
962 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1998).
Normally, the prosecutor's wide range of discretion in deciding when and what crimes to
prosecute do not render the statute unconstitutional. Puetz, 129 Idaho at 844, 934 P.2d at 17;

Pena-Reyes, 131 Idaho at 657, 962 P.2d at 1041. However, in this case, the prosecutor did not
charge the Lopezes with a different offense and, instead, alleged that the amount the trafficked
was less than the quantity of meth than they actually possessed in exchange for the Lopezes'
assistance prosecuting Tabatha.
The crime of trafficking in methamphetamine under section 37-2732B(a)(4) is committed
when there was a knowing possession, delivery, or bringing of the methamphetamine into Idaho
and the weight of the substance was 28 grams or greater. Wilson, 165 Idaho at 68, 438 P.3d at
306. Thus, the prosecutor did not charge the Lopezes with a different crime and, instead, alleged
a lower weight so that the court would have the authority to sentence under the mandatory
minimum that applied to the quantity that the Lopezes actually trafficked. Cf Rogerson, 132
Idaho at 57, 966 P.2d at 57 (LC. §§ 37-2732 and 37-2732B provide distinct offenses, one with
enhanced penalties based on quantity and the other enhancing penalties based intent).
Nor did the prosecutor's decision further the statute's purpose in curbing large scale
traffickers by obtaining information regarding drug dealers further up the distribution chain.
Instead, the prosecutor reduced the Lopezes sentences for helping obtain convictions for the least
culpable person -

Tabatha, whose cut involved getting high and a few hundred dollars to help
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drive. The prosecutor did not change the amount of meth alleged to be involved in Tabatha's
charges, on the other hand, because she declined to assist law enforcement and took the case to
trial.
Significantly, the prosecutor had consistently acknowledged Tabatha's relatively minor
role and acknowledged the charging decision reflected the Lopezes' cooperation and Tabatha's
decision not to cooperate with law enforcement. Thus, unlike other situations where prosecutors
exercise discretion based on a number of factors, the record reveals that substantial assistance
was the determining factor both in reducing the sentences faced by the Lopezes and in
maintaining Tabatha at the 10 year mandatory minimum.
The prosecutor's authority to charge a lower quantity based on substantial assistance,
thereby authorizing the judge to sentence to a lower mandatory minimum, is indistinguishable
from the prosecutor's authority under the prior trafficking statute, which also authorized the
judge to sentence under the mandatory minimum based on substantial assistance. Thus, Section
37-2732B(a)(4)(C)'s application in this case does not fall within the narrow limitation on the
judiciary's inherent authority to sentence and the district court had the authority to exercise its
discretion in determining Tabatha's term of imprisonment.

4.

This Court must vacate Tabatha's sentences because the state's charging
decision in the consolidated cases violated her rights to equal protection and
due process under the Idaho and federal constitution and impermissibly
infringed on her privilege against self-incrimination and her constitutional
rights to trial

"Where the facts legitimately invoke more than one statute, a prosecutor is vested with a
wide range of discretion in deciding what crime to prosecute." State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8,

18

12, 27 P.3d 417,421 (Ct. App. 2001) quoting LaBarge v. State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59,
62 (Ct. App. 1989). Prosecutors necessarily must choose between statutes with varying
sentencing schemes each time a defendant's actions satisfy the elements of more than one statute
and this discretion to choose between two statutes that proscribe the same conduct but provide
for different penalties does not generally violate the state or federal constitution. Hernandez, 136
Idaho at 12, 27 P.3d at 421; Payan, 132 Idaho at 617, 977 P.2d at 231. Thus, a prosecutor can
properly elect to charge a defendant with trafficking instead of possession with intent to deliver
when the charging decision is motivated by the quantity of drugs at issue. See Payan, 132 Idaho
at 617, 977 P.2d at 231
Here, the Lopezes and Tabatha were all convicted of and sentenced for the same crime trafficking in methamphetamine. Cf Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 617, 977 P.2d 228, 231 (noting that
I.C. § 37-2732B and LC. § 37-2732 define different crimes and when defendant's conduct
satisfies either statute, the prosecutor may elect which crime to charge). However, because the
Lopezes testified against Tabatha, the prosecutor cited the subsection that would apply if the
quantity involved was between 200 and 400 grams.
Thus, the prosecutor did not exercise her discretion to charge the Lopezes with a reduced
charge. Instead, the prosecutor cited a subsection that applied to a quantity much lower than the
Lopezes actually trafficked, which permitted the district court to impose a lower mandatory
mm1mum.
Moreover, due process requires that prosecutors not exercise their discretion on the basis
of an impermissible ground such as race, religion or exercise of constitutional rights. United
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States v. Pitts, 908 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380, 1386
(9th Cir.1985); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). The Equal Protection
Clauses require, at a minimum, that government action be rationally related to legitimate
governmental objectives. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States v. Kinsey,
843 F.2d 383, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby,
225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000); Payan, 132 Idaho at 616, 977 P.2d at 230.
Here, the prosecutor indicted Tabatha for conspiracy the day after her trafficking case was
set for trial. The prosecutor explained her decision as being in response to Tabatha's decision to
plead not guilty and to decline to cooperate with law enforcement -

in other words, in response

to Tabatha's exercise of her rights to remain silent and to a trial by jury. Conversely, the
prosecutor reduced the quantity alleged against the Lopezes because they waived their rights and
testified against Tabatha, who even the prosecutor acknowledged with the least culpable party.
The Idaho legislature's decision to not require proof of delivery or intent to deliver in the
definition of the crime it called "trafficking" is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest
in curbing large-scale possession, manufacturing, and distribution of controlled substance.

Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 56, 966 P.2d at 56. In Payan, the Court held that the defendant's
prosecution for trafficking did not violate equal protection because he "has not suggested that the
state's choice was motivated by any factor other than the large quantity of drugs he was
convicted of distributing." Payan, 132 Idaho at 618, 977 P.2d at 232.
Here, it is undisputed that the Lopezes made a living by selling pounds of
methamphetamine for several months and that Tabatha was paid a few hundred dollars to help
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drive on two occasions. Thus, the prosecutor's decision to hold Tabatha accountable for the
actual weight of meth involved in the offense and to cite a lower quantity with respect to the
Lopezes was inversely related to the parties' respective culpability. Rather than being motivated
by the large quantity of drugs, the state's decision in this case was motivated by Tabatha's
decision to exercise her rights to remain silent and require the state to prove her guilt.
Nor can the charging decision be characterized as furthering the state's legitimate interest
in curbing large-scale drug trafficking. Had the reduction in the Lopezes sentences been in
exchange for testimony against someone higher up the distribution chain, the "fact bargaining"
could be justified by helping law enforcement bring down bigger fish.
However, reducing the punishment for the most culpable to ensure Tabatha's decade-long
imprisonment distorts, rather than furthers the statute's goal. The state's decision to allege the
Lopezes possessed between 200 and 400 grams in exchange for testifying against Tabatha
bears no rational relationship to the state's legitimate interest and violates due process and equal
protection.

B.

This Court Must Vacate Tabatha's Judgment Of Conviction For Trafficking In
Methamphetamine Because Insufficient Evidence Supported The Verdict And The
Conviction Therefore Violates Due Process As Guaranteed By The Fourteenth
Amendment To The United States Constitution And Article 1, Section 13 Of The
Idaho Constitution
Due process as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution dictates that no person can be made to
suffer the onus of conviction except upon sufficient evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact
beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense. Jackson v. Virginia,
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443 U.S. 307, 316,(1979); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,460, 272 P.3d 417, 432 (2012). This
Court's inquiry is whether a rational juror viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
after. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; State v. Coats, 165 Idaho 323,444 P.3d 895,898 (2019).
The crime of trafficking in methamphetamine under section 37-2732B(a)(4) requires the
state to prove two critical elements to sustain a conviction: ( 1) the defendant knowingly
possessed, delivered, or brought methamphetamine into Idaho; and (2) the substance weighed 28
grams or more. Wilson, 165 Idaho at 68, 438 P.3d at 306. A person is guilty of aiding and abetting
the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine if she assisted others in knowingly possessing,
delivering, or bringing methamphetamine into Idaho and shared their criminal intent. LC. §
18-204; Wilson, 165 Idaho 64, 438 P.3d 302, 305; State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 787, 391 P.3d
1252, 1257 (2017). Conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine requires the state to prove (1) the
defendant and at least one other person agreed to traffic in at least 28 grams of methamphetamine
(2) at least one of the conspirators performed some act in furtherance of the agreement, and (3)
the defendant had the requisite intent to traffic in methamphetamine. Smith, 161 Idaho at 787,
391 P.3d at 1257; State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690, 201 P.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 2008). The
state is not required to prove that either the principle or any aider or abettor knew the actual
weight of methamphetamine. Wilson, 165 Idaho at 68, 438 P.3d at 306; see also State v. Barraza-

Martinez, 139 Idaho 624, 626, 84 P.3d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2003).
Insufficient evidence established that Tabatha had the power and intent to control the
methamphetamine in Doug's backpack that forms the basis for the trafficking charge and,
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therefore, no rational juror could have found that Tabatha was guilty as a principle to trafficking
in methamphetamine. Moreover, Tabatha's trafficking conviction cannot be sustained on theory
that she aided and abetted the Lopezes by helping to drive to California, where she was
convicted of conspiring to traffic in methamphetamine by agreeing to help them drive.
Accordingly, Tabatha's trafficking conviction violates due process and must be vacated.
1.

The state presented insufficient evidence to prove that Tabatha constructively
possessed the methamphetamine in Doug's backpack

In order to prove constructive possession, knowledge of the controlled substance and
physical control of the controlled substance must be independently proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, by either circumstantial or direct evidence. State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 360, 900 P.2d
1367, 1371 (1995); see also State v. Greene, 100 Idaho 464, 466, 600 P.2d 140, 142 (1979); State
v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882, 885, 771 P.2d 546, 549 (Ct. App. 1989). Constructive possession of a
controlled substance exists where a nexus between the accused and the substance is sufficiently
proven so as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander
but, rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance. State v.
Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784, 735 P.2d 1089, 1095 (Ct. App. 1987); Rogerson, 132 Idaho at 58,
966 P.2d at 58.
Here, the prosecutor did not present evidence that Tabatha had the power or intent to
control the methamphetamine in Doug's backpack. Instead, the prosecutor relied on evidence
that Tabatha knew Doug had a large quantity and that she had the power and intent to control
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smaller quantities in the travel bong and other paraphernalia. Tr. p. 215, In. 6-16 (prosecutor
indicating that she added all the meth in vehicle for the trafficking charge).
However, the methamphetamine for personal use, although taken from the larger quantity,
is distinct from the bulk hidden within Doug's backpack. By analogy, consider a scenario where
Tabatha helped the Lopezes drive to California to obtain several crates of avocados for sale at the
Lopezes' produce market. Then suppose that Doug used one of those avocados to make
guacamole for everyone to eat with chips on the ride home.
That Tabatha possessed the bowl of guacamole would not give her dominion or control
over the avocados in the crates, despite the fact she knew they were there and had agreed to help
drive so Doug could purchase those avocados. Indeed, Tabatha would be committing theft if she
took an avocado for toast in the morning without permission. And Tabatha's license to use the
methamphetamine in the travel bong would not save her from dire consequences if she helped
herself to an ounce from the trash bag hidden in the backpack.
Nor is the circumstance analogous to one where the person "owning" the
methamphetamine is not in vehicle. If Tabatha had been paid to drive to California alone to
transport the methamphetamine, she necessarily would have had temporary authority to exercise
dominion over the meth while in her care.
Conversely, with Doug along, Tabatha had no more power or intent to control the meth in
Doug's backpack than she had power and intent to control the money in Doug's wallet and her
role truly was limited to helping drive the vehicle. See also Tr. p. 278, In. 12-14 (Tabatha's role
was "just to help drive"). Evidence that Tabatha knew of the meth in Doug's backpack and
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possessed smaller quantities set aside for consumption in the paraphernalia is legally insufficient
to establish that Tabatha knowingly possessed the bulk methamphetamine stashed in Doug's
duffle bag. Accordingly, her judge of conviction must be vacated.

2.

Double jeopardy precludes Tabatha's trafficking conviction being sustained
on the theory her driving aided and abetted the Lopezes' trafficking, where
she was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine for agreeing
to help drive

The state alleged that Tabatha committed the crime of trafficking in more than 400 grams
of methamphetamine on or about June 13, 2018 by bringing meth "to this state and/or
knowingly" possessing it. While the information neither cited LC. § 18-204 nor alleged facts
constituting aiding and abetting, it is assumed to have also charged her as an abettor because
there is no distinction between principals and those who aid and abet. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at
462, 272 P.3d at 434; State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 976, 188 P.3d 912, 918 (2008). Thus, the
information necessarily alleged that Tabatha aided and abetted the Lopezes trafficking in
methamphetamine by helping them drive to California and return to Idaho with
methamphetamine.
Further, after Tabatha declined to cooperate with law enforcement, the state sought and
obtained an indictment charging Tabatha with conspiring with the Lopezes to traffic in 400
grams or more of methamphetamine by "willfully and knowingly combin[ing], conspir[ing],
confederat[ing] and agree[ing] to traffic in a controlled substance, by knowingly bringing into
the state, possessing and/or delivering" methamphetamine." R. 158-160. The district court
granted the state's motion to consolidate the two cases. R. 167-168.
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Generally, a conviction and sentence on a count charging conspiracy will not, on the
theory of double punishment, prevent conviction and sentence on another count charging the
substantive offense. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); State v. Sanchez-Castro,
157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2014); State v. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 567, 682 P.2d
105, 108 (Ct. App. 1984). Nevertheless, under both the federal and Idaho double jeopardy
clauses, "a defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense." State

v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 841, 291 P.3d 1036, 1040 (2013). There are two theories under
which a particular offense may be determined to be a lesser included offense of a charged
offense: the statutory theory and the pleading theory. See State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527529, 261 P.3d 519, 521-523 (2011). Under the pleading theory, a lesser included offense is one
"alleged in the information as a means or element of the commission of the higher offense." State

v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433-34, 614 P.2d 970, 973-74 (1980); McKinney, 153 Idaho at
841, 291 P.3d at 1040.
The statutory definitions of trafficking and conspiracy do not define the same crime and
neither is included in the other under the statutory theory. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 649, 339
P.3d at 374. However, the same conduct can constitute aiding and abetting the delivery of an
unlawful drug and a conspiracy to deliver the drug. Smith, 161 Idaho at 787, 391 P.3d at 1257;

State v. Weatherly, 160 Idaho 302, 304, 371 P.3d 815, 817 (Ct. App. 2016).
Here, it is undisputed that Tabatha's role in both the conspiracy and the trafficking
offense was helping the Lopezes drive. Tabatha could not aid and abet the Lopezes' trafficking
by helping to drive without agreeing to drive. Accordingly, the agreement underlying the
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conspiracy to traffic was the means by which Tabatha aided and abetted the Lopezes' possession
and transportation of the two pounds and Tabatha's trafficking conviction cannot be sustained on
an aiding and abetting theory without violating double jeopardy. The Court should therefore
vacate Tabatha's conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine.

IV. CONCLUSION
The 10 year mandatory minimum sentences in this case, which were imposed pursuant to
subsection LC. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(C), unconstitutionally infringed on the district court's inherent
sentencing authority and violated Tabatha's rights to due process, to equal protection, to remain
silent and to trial. Further, the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain the trafficking
conviction and due process requires that it be vacated. Accordingly, this Court should vacate
Tabatha's judgment of conviction and sentences and remand with instruction for the district court
to re-sentence Tabatha on the conspiracy charge without regard to the mandatory minimum fixed
periods of imprisonment delineated in LC. § 37-2732B(a)(4).
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of January 2020.
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